851 Appendix D: On the Concept of "Myth" (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) 853 xvii asking about the conditions of possibility for liberal theology, understood as a modern reinterpretation of Christianity. 3 The assumption is that such a theology is beyond the bounds of genuine Christianity.
Liberalism is repudiated as an "accommodation" to modernity, which conforms the gospel to an alien context that demands a thorough reconstruction of traditional doctrines. 4 Ironically, at the same time that liberalism is disparaged as an accommodation to modernity, mission is praised as a "contextualization" of the gospel for a particular culture. This presents us with a dilemma: the same logic rejected under the name of liberalism is affirmed under the name of mission.
The only discernible difference, it seems, is chronological. 5 Rein-3. This is an intentionally broad definition of "liberal theology." Bultmann refers to liberalism in generally pejorative terms to indicate a very specific form of theology against which he and Barth were reacting, one marked by idealism and historicism in particular. But Bultmann also acknowledges that his own theology contributes to a broader and less problematic conception of liberal theology, and it is the positive sense of the term that I have in mind here.
This view is represented most recently by Roger E. Olson, The Journey of Modern Theology:
From Reconstruction to Deconstruction (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2013). According to
Olson's narrative, modern theology is a struggle between those who "accommodated" modernity (liberals) and those who "rejected" it (conservatives and fundamentalists), while dialectical theology offered a third way that neither accommodated modernity nor rejected theology's responsibility in the world. Karl Barth, on this reading, "held firmly to the gospel of Jesus Christ, within a supernatural frame of reference, seeking to communicate it in as relevant a way [as] possible to contemporary culture" (ibid., 712). Adherence to the supernatural, however, is a mark of the rejection of modernity, and mere "relevant communication" does not count as genuine interpretation. Conservatives would never say their talk of God is irrelevant to the modern world. As we will see, Olson has missed the fact that what differentiates dialectical theology from liberal theology is not whether it accommodates modernity. Whereas liberalism reconstructs Christianity in response to modernity, dialectical theology claims that ongoing reconstruction and accommodation has always been basic to Christian faith as such. 5. Another possible point of difference between the two is that crosscultural mission today does not change the (traditional, orthodox) content but merely the linguistic mode of expression. By contrast, so the thinking goes, liberalism is a change in content as well as form. But this begs a number of questions. Most importantly, it assumes we know what the content actually is, as if the substance of the faith is a universal, self-evident given. Consequently, it also assumes we know that liberalism does change the content. But this ends in a vicious circle. Liberalism is defined as whatever changes the content of the faith, but the content of the faith is defined over against the changes of liberalism. The result is that the goalposts continually shift: we define as "liberal" whomever we do not like by defining as "gospel" whatever it is we think that person has reinterpreted. To define the content in terms of some set of conciliar dogmas or confessional doctrines is no clarification, since those dogmas and doctrines still have to be interpreted and are just as culturally situated as the biblical text. Beyond the question of content, there is terpreting crossculturally is the gospel; reinterpreting crossculturally over time, apparently, is heresy. Christianity can be reconstructed synchronically but not diachronically. Matters are only made more confusing when we find Paul's method in 1 Cor 9:19-23 defined as "missionary accommodation." 6 Where exactly does mission end and the threat of liberalism begin?
The problem represented by the apparent tension between liberalism and mission comes to expression, however obliquely, in Joseph
Cahill's retrospective on Rudolf Bultmann's legacy. "All forms of liberalism, be they political, social, economic, or religious," he writes, "are ultimately based on accommodation-accommodating old truths to new realities." 7 Later in the article, he then situates Bultmann in the context of "missionary efforts at propagating the gospel":
[Matteo] Ricci's visit to Nan-ch'angin in 1595, to Nanking in 1597, to Peking in 1601, and [Roberto] de Nobili's work in India, beginning in 1610, were brief and early flashes across the religious sky-efforts at accommodation to the realistically pluralistic world which have only recently begun to have a permanent effect. The basic question they and the additional issue that the form-content distinction wielded by conservatives in these debates is culturally and hermeneutically naïve, as if there is any content not already shaped by cultural presuppositions and norms. Indeed, the great irony of this approach is that it is formally identical to Adolf von Harnack's husk-kernel distinction, which is a hallmark of classic liberal theology. The conservative defense of mission against liberalism ends up only repeating liberalism-and, in particular, one of its more problematic instances. The point is that the logic supporting mission is essentially identical to the logic supporting at least a basic form of liberal theology (understood as theology reconstructed within modernity). Rejecting liberalism tout court means either rejecting mission altogether or defining it in such a way that one ends by endorsing an imperialistic (i.e., noncontextualizing) mode of mission. 6. Michael Barram, "The Bible, Mission, and Social Location: Toward a Missional Hermeneutic,"
Interpretation 61, no. 1 (2007): 42-58, at 55. Certainly missiologists are keen on differentiating contextualization from accommodation, but the distinction is a slippery one. Contextualization is a broad, ambiguous concept whose meaning is contested by those on the "right" and "left."
The very attempt to differentiate it from accommodation is itself motivated by the desire not to be perceived as "liberal." The assumption is that liberalism surrenders the gospel to culture and thereby exchanges orthodoxy for some kind of heterodoxy. This raises questions about whether the motivation to preserve orthodoxy (whose orthodoxy?) is a valid motivation and constraint on the theological and missionary endeavor. Gogarten, the old metaphysical and teleological interpretation of the world and our existence in it, which understood the world to be the unfolding of an overarching divine plan, was replaced by a historical interpretation:
Just as the contents of a play are established beforehand in the major and minor roles which appear in it, so too the occurrences in this history are predetermined in the "spiritual substances of all hierarchies," which "are united in the church into a mystical body, which extends from the trinity and the angels that are nearest to the trinity down to the beggar at 8. Ibid., 491-92. 9. Ibid., 494.
the church door and to the serf kneeling humbly in the furthest corner of the church to receive the sacrifice of the Mass." But since history is understood in this way as a kingdom of metaphysical essences or substances, moved teleologically in itself and encompassing the entire world in this teleology, we lose precisely what we understand as the actual occurrence, namely, the living personal experiences of particular individuals in their distinctiveness and responsibility, their historical significance. Their historicity is taken away when history anticipates them by occurring within the framework of metaphysical essences. And it is only because this metaphysical framework contains the life of human beings with all that has happened that they have a part in the history which takes place there. If the latter is the case, as we shall argue, then we are thrust into a complicated debate over the nature and development of Barth's theology. We will wade into some of these disputes in the first two In the introduction to his work on Barth and Bultmann, James
Smart makes the following comment:
It might be thought that the intention in considering the two men together is to attempt once more to bridge the gap between them, to recognize their points both of agreement and of divergence, and then perhaps to establish a theological position in line with their points of agreement but reconciling somehow their separate contributions where they diverge. 
